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RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Defendants Joel Berberena and Denroy Gayle appeal 
from orders entered in response to their 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(2) motions for sentence reductions to reflect 
amendments to the United States Sentencing Guidelines that 
narrow the disparity between sentences for crack cocaine and 
powder cocaine offenses.
1
  They urge that their respective 
District Courts were not bound by Guidelines § 1B1.10, a 
newly revised policy statement that limits the extent to which 
a sentence may be reduced below the prisoner‟s amended 
Guidelines range.  Defendants contend that, by preventing 
district courts from straying from the amended Guidelines 
range to account for departures and variances awarded as part 
of a prisoner‟s sentence, the Commission (1) exceeded its 
statutory authority, (2) violated separation-of-powers 
principles, and (3) failed to comply with the Administrative 
Procedure Act‟s (“APA”) notice-and-comment requirements.  
For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Courts‟ 
refusal to reduce Defendants‟ sentences below their amended 
Guidelines ranges. 
I. 
 In 2003, Berberena pled guilty to conspiracy to 
distribute crack cocaine and powder cocaine, in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 846; possession of crack cocaine with intent to 
                                              
 
1
 Defendants‟ criminal cases were unrelated below.  
Defendants filed an unopposed motion to consolidate their 
appeals, as they raised the same issues.  The Clerk of this 
Court granted the motion, consolidating the two appeals for 
all purposes. 
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distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and 
possession of powder cocaine with intent to distribute, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  After his sentence was 
vacated in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005), the District Court resentenced him, calculating an 
advisory Guidelines range of 210-262 months but varying 
downward to impose a sentence of 150 months in prison.
2
  In 
2009, Berberena moved for a sentence reduction in light of 
Amendment 706 to the Guidelines, which reduced the base 
offense levels for most crack-related offenses.  His amended 
Guidelines range was 168-210 months.  The District Court 
granted Berberena a variance from the amended range 
proportional to the variance it awarded him previously and 
reduced his sentence to 135 months. 
 In 2006, a jury convicted Gayle of possession of a 
firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(1); possession of crack cocaine with intent to 
distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and 
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 
crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  In 2007, the 
District Court calculated a Guidelines range of 168-210 
months for the § 922(g) and § 841(a) convictions, but varied 
downward to 120 months based upon the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and Gayle‟s personal history and 
characteristics.  Because Gayle‟s § 924(c) conviction carried 
a mandatory consecutive 60-month sentence, the District 
Court sentenced him to a total of 180 months in prison. 
 In 2010, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act 
(“FSA”) to “restore fairness to Federal cocaine sentencing” 
                                              
 
2
 The record does not indicate the District Court‟s 
reason for granting Berberena a downward variance. 
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by changing the threshold quantities of crack cocaine that 
trigger mandatory minimum sentences.  Pub. L. 111-220, § 2, 
124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010).  Pursuant to its authority to 
amend the Guidelines consistent with the FSA, id. § 8, the 
Commission promulgated Amendment 750.  This amendment 
reduced the crack-related offense levels in § 2D1.1 of the 
Guidelines.  The Commission made Amendment 750 
retroactive by adding it to the list of amendments on the basis 
of which prisoners can move for reduced sentences.  See 
U.S.S.G., App. C., amd. 759.  That list appears in subsection 
(c) of the Commission‟s policy statement at § 1B1.10 of the 
Guidelines, which governs sentence reductions as a result of 
amendments to the Guidelines. 
 After the new crack-related offense levels became 
effective, both Berberena and Gayle moved for sentence 
reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
3
  As a result of 
                                              
 
3
 Section 3582(c)(2) establishes an exception to the 
general rule that a court may not modify a term of 
imprisonment once it has been imposed.  It provides: 
 
[I]n the case of a defendant who 
has been sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment based on a 
sentencing range that has 
subsequently been lowered by the 
Sentencing Commission pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. 994(o) . . . the court 
may reduce the term of 
imprisonment, after considering 
the factors set forth in section 
3553(a) to the extent that they are 
6 
 
Amendment 750, Berberena‟s range changed from 168-210 
months to 135-168 months.  Having already been sentenced 
to 135 months‟ imprisonment, Berberena sought a further 
reduction from the low end of the new range proportional to 
the variance he received previously.  The range for Gayle‟s § 
922(g) and § 841(a) convictions changed from 168-210 
months to 110-137 months, to which the mandatory 
consecutive 60-month sentence for his § 924(c) conviction 
would be added.  Gayle similarly urged the court to reduce 
his 120-month sentence for the first two offenses below the 
minimum of the amended range to account for the downward 
variance it granted him originally.   
 The government opposed Defendants‟ motions.  It 
cited the Commission‟s most recent revision to the policy 
statement at § 1B1.10, which prohibits courts from reducing a 
“defendant‟s term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(2) . . . to a term that is less than the minimum of the 
amended guideline range.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A).  The 
earlier version of the policy statement had permitted prisoners 
who, like Defendants, originally received below-Guidelines 
sentences to obtain reductions below their amended ranges in 
proportion to their earlier departures or variances.  Id. § 
1B1.10(b)(2)(B) (2010) (amended 2011).  However, it 
provided that, while comparable reductions to account for 
departures “may be appropriate,” comparable reductions to 
                                                                                                     
applicable, if such a reduction is 
consistent with applicable policy 
statements issued by the 
Sentencing Commission. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). 
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account for variances “generally would not be appropriate.”4  
Concluding that the “distinction [between departures and 
variances] has been difficult to apply and has prompted 
litigation,” the Commission further closed the variance door, 
so to speak, in adopting Amendment 750.  See Notice of Final 
Action Regarding Amendment to Policy Statement 1B1.10, 
76 Fed. Reg. 41332, 41334 (July 13, 2011).  The result was 
the policy statement that the District Courts applied here.  It 
prohibits a reduction below the low end of a prisoner‟s new 
                                              
 
4
 In full, the earlier version of the limitation at issue 
read: 
 
If the original term of 
imprisonment imposed was less 
than the term of imprisonment 
provided by the guideline range 
applicable to the defendant at the 
time of sentencing, a reduction 
comparably less than the amended 
guideline range . . . may be 
appropriate.  However, if the 
original term of imprisonment 
constituted a non-guideline 
sentence determined pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005), a further reduction 
generally would not be 
appropriate. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) (2010) (amended 2011). 
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range, even if the prisoner originally received a below-
Guidelines sentence.  The only exception is for defendants 
whose below-Guidelines sentences were based on a 
“government motion to reflect the defendant‟s substantial 
assistance to authorities.”  Only then is a reduction below the 
bottom of a prisoner‟s amended range allowed.  U.S.S.G. § 
1B1.10(b)(2)(B).
5
  
                                              
 
5
 The current version of § 1B1.10(b)(2) reads: 
 
(A) Limitation.—Except as 
provided in subdivision (B), the 
court shall not reduce the 
defendant‟s term of imprisonment 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and 
this policy statement to a term that 
is less than the minimum of the 
amended guideline range 
determined under subdivision (1) 
of this subsection. 
 
(B) Exception for Substantial 
Assistance.—If the term of 
imprisonment imposed was less 
than the term of imprisonment 
provided by the guideline range 
applicable to the defendant at the 
time of sentencing pursuant to a 
government motion to reflect the 
defendant‟s substantial assistance 
to authorities, a reduction 
comparably less than the amended 
9 
 
 Before the District Courts, the government cited § 
3582(c)(2)‟s requirement that sentence reductions be 
“consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the 
Sentencing Commission” to argue that § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A)‟s 
limitation was binding.  Defendants, however, urged that the 
revised version of § 1B1.10 exceeded the Commission‟s 
statutory authority, violated separation-of-powers principles, 
and failed to comply with the APA‟s notice-and-comment 
requirements.  Neither convinced the District Judges before 
whom they filed their § 3582(c)(2) motions to ignore the 
policy statement and reduce their sentences below the 
amended Guidelines ranges.  Instead, the District Judges 
abided by the revised limitation.  Berberena‟s motion was 
denied because his original sentence of 135 months was at the 
bottom of the new range.  Gayle‟s motion was granted in part 
only, resulting in a 170-month sentence at the bottom of the 
new range—110 months for the § 922(g) and § 841(a) 
convictions, and 60 consecutive months for the § 924(c) 
conviction.
6
  
                                                                                                     
guideline range determined under 
subdivision (1) of this subsection 
may be appropriate. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A)-(B). 
 
 
6
 Proportional reductions to account for the variances 
originally received by each would have resulted in a sentence 
of approximately 109 months for Berberena and 139 months 
for Gayle. 
10 
 
 Both Defendants timely appealed.
7
 
II. 
 On appeal, Defendants advance the same arguments 
they urged below.
8
  They contend that the Commission‟s 
revised limitation on proportional reductions suffers from 
three infirmities, each of which, they say, suffices to deprive 
it of binding effect.  First, they argue that the Commission 
exceeded its authority under the Sentencing Reform Act 
(“SRA”) by effectively undoing variances and departures 
awarded to a prisoner when he was originally sentenced.  
Second, they argue that, in revising § 1B1.10, the 
                                              
 
7
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  Generally, a district court‟s denial 
of a sentence reduction is reviewed only for abuse of 
discretion.  United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 154 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  But when, as here, a defendant raises purely legal 
issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation, we 
exercise plenary review.  United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 
307 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 
 
8
 These are issues of first impression in this circuit.  
Two of our sister courts of appeals, however, have considered 
them in some detail.  In United States v. Horn, the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Defendants‟ arguments as 
they related to the Commission‟s binding retroactivity 
determinations.  See 679 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2012).  And more 
recently, in United States v. Anderson, the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals rejected Defendants‟ arguments with 
respect to the Commission‟s limitation on below-Guidelines 
reductions—the same limitation at issue here.  See 686 F.3d 
585 (8th Cir. 2012). 
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Commission exercised legislative and judicial authority in 
violation of separation-of-powers principles.  Last, they argue 
that the Commission‟s notice-and-comment procedure was 
inadequate to render the limitation an otherwise valid, binding 
rule.  We consider each argument in turn. 
A.  Commission Authority 
 Congress granted the Commission the power to issue 
binding policy statements regarding the extent to which 
sentences may be reduced based upon retroactive Guidelines 
amendments.  The Commission exercised that authority when 
it limited courts‟ discretion to reduce a prisoner‟s sentence 
below his amended Guidelines range.  
 The starting point for our analysis of the 
Commission‟s authority is the SRA.  Most pertinent here is 
28 U.S.C. § 994(u), pursuant to which the Commission 
amended § 1B1.10.  See Notice of Final Action Regarding 
Amendment to Policy Statement 1B1.10, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
41332 (“The Sentencing Commission hereby gives notice of 
an amendment to a policy statement and commentary made 
pursuant to its authority under 28 U.S.C. 994(a) and (u).”).  
That provision states: 
If the Commission reduces the 
term of imprisonment 
recommended in the guidelines 
applicable to a particular offense 
or category of offenses, it shall 
specify in what circumstances and 
by what amount the sentences of 
prisoners serving terms of 
12 
 
imprisonment for the offense may 
be reduced.  
28 U.S.C. § 994(u) (emphasis added).  The SRA, then, 
authorizes the Commission to decide not only whether—“in 
what circumstances”—an amendment is to apply retroactively 
but also the extent to which—“by what amount”—sentences 
may be reduced based on those that it makes retroactive.  See 
Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2691 (2010) (“The 
SRA charges the Commission . . . with determining whether 
and to what extent an amendment will be retroactive.” (citing 
28 U.S.C. § 994(u))).  Congress therefore delegated to the 
Commission the power it exercised when revising § 1B1.10.  
In prohibiting reductions below a prisoner‟s amended 
Guidelines range, the Commission plainly indicated “by what 
amount” sentences may be reduced on the basis of retroactive 
amendments.  See United States v. Anderson, 686 F.3d 585, 
589 (8th Cir. 2012) (“By limiting reductions below the 
amended guideline range to an amount comparable to an 
earlier reduction for substantial assistance, the Commission 
has specified the „circumstances and by what amount‟ a 
sentence may be reduced.” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(u))). 
 Another provision in the SRA authorizes—indeed, 
requires—the Commission to exercise its authority over 
sentence reductions by issuing policy statements.  In Section 
994(a), “Congress considered the difference between 
„guidelines‟ and „policy statements,‟ and directed the 
Commission to use each in different situations.”  United 
States v. Horn, 679 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir. 2012).  Congress 
sought for the Commission to issue policy statements to 
address, among other topics, “the appropriate use of . . . the 
sentence modification provisions set forth in section[] . . . 
3582(c) of title 18.”  28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(C).  The Sixth 
13 
 
Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that “[t]his section 
can only be read as a directive for the Commission to issue 
policy statements regarding the retroactivity of Guidelines 
amendments.”  Horn, 679 F.3d at 401.  The same is true with 
respect to the Commission‟s related authority—also based in 
§ 994(u)—to determine the extent to which prisoners‟ 
sentences may be reduced based upon those amendments it 
makes retroactive.
9
 
 Defendants attempt to cabin the Commission‟s 
authority by claiming that Congress did not intend for the 
Commission to disrupt elements of a prisoner‟s original 
sentence that are unrelated to the amendment pursuant to 
                                              
 
9
 In urging the opposite conclusion, Defendants 
unconvincingly compare § 994(u) and § 994(t).  Section 
994(t) specifically directs the Commission to issue policy 
statements addressing a sentence modification procedure 
similar to § 3582(c)(2).  28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (“The 
Commission, in promulgating general policy statements 
regarding the sentencing modification provisions in section 
3582(c)(1)(A) of title 18, shall describe what should be 
considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence 
reduction . . . .”).  According to Defendants, the absence of a 
similar reference to policy statements in § 994(u) 
demonstrates that it “does not contemplate issuance of 
binding policy statements to implement § 3582(c).”  
Appellants‟ Br. at 37.  Confusingly, though, they 
simultaneously acknowledge that § 994(a)(2)(C) “requires the 
Commission to issue policy statements that will pertain to § 
3582(c)(2) proceedings.”  Id.  This “appears to destroy [the] 
contrast between § 994(u) and § 994(t).”  Horn, 679 F.3d at 
403. 
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which he seeks a reduction.  They argue that the Commission 
has improperly “undone” aspects of below-Guidelines 
sentences by forbidding judges from reimposing variances 
and departures they previously deemed appropriate.  Reply 
Br. at 3.  This argument misses the mark.  We cannot intuit an 
intent unmoored from Congress‟ directives.  As demonstrated 
above, § 994(u) authorizes the Commission to issue policy 
statements regarding when and how sentences may be 
reduced based on its amendments to the Guidelines.  
Nowhere did Congress require that the Commission permit 
judges to fashion a reduction with exactly the same tools—
departures and variances—they originally used to set an 
appropriate sentence.  See Anderson, 686 F.3d at 589-90 
(“The statutory framework does not require the Commission 
to make all downward departures and variances applied to the 
original sentence available when creating a basis for 
sentencing reduction.”).  Rather than undo the effect of 
previous departures and variances, the Commission has 
merely limited the extent to which new ones can be awarded 
in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings.  
 Indeed, the text of § 3582(c)(2) makes clear that 
Congress contemplated that the Commission would have the 
power to impose limits on these types of sentence reductions, 
by making the Commission‟s policy statements binding.  
Section 3582(c)(2) provides: 
[I]n the case of a defendant who 
has been sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment based on a 
sentencing range that has 
subsequently been lowered by the 
Sentencing Commission . . . , the 
court may reduce the term of 
15 
 
imprisonment, after considering 
the factors set forth in section 
3553(a) to the extent that they are 
applicable, if such a reduction is 
consistent with applicable policy 
statements issued by the 
Sentencing Commission. 
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (emphasis added).  While Defendants 
contend that the “consistent with” language does not 
necessarily make § 1B1.10 binding, we disagree.
10
  Indeed, in 
United States v. Doe, we rejected such an interpretation and 
do not revisit that decision here.  564 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 
2009) (“Under the express statutory language of § 3582(c)(2) 
and § 994(u), the Commission‟s policy statements 
implementing retroactive sentence reduction are binding.”).  
“If a sentence reduction is inconsistent with a policy 
statement, it would violate § 3582(c)‟s directive, so policy 
                                              
 
10
 Defendants claim that there are other provisions of 
the SRA that contain similar “consistent with” language, but 
with respect to which the Commission has not issued binding 
policy statements.  They point to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), 
which requires that sentence reductions for extraordinary and 
compelling reasons be consistent with applicable policy 
statements of the Commission.  But, Defendants fail to 
recognize that the policy statement that governs such 
reductions lists circumstances that qualify as extraordinary 
and compelling under § 3582(c)(1)(A), thereby restricting 
district courts just like § 1B1.10.  See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. 
n.1.   
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statements must be binding.”  United States v. Garcia, 655 
F.3d 426, 435 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 The Supreme Court‟s opinion in Dillon v. United 
States reinforces our view that § 3582(c)(2) requires district 
courts to comply with the Commission‟s policy statements.  
There, the Court interpreted § 3582(c)(2) as “requir[ing] the 
court to follow the Commission’s instructions in § 1B1.10 to 
determine the prisoner‟s eligibility for a sentence 
modification and the extent of the reduction authorized.”  
Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at 2691 (emphasis added).  The Court‟s use 
of the term “requires” cannot reasonably be read to make the 
Commission‟s decisions regarding the extent to which 
sentences may be reduced anything but mandatory.  In fact, it 
is the mandatory nature of the Commission‟s limitation on 
sentence reductions that gave rise to the very Booker 
argument considered, and rejected, by the Court in Dillon.  
See, e.g., id. at 2690 (“Under Dillon‟s approach, Booker 
would preclude the Commission from issuing a policy 
statement that generally forecloses below-Guidelines 
sentences at § 3582(c)(2) proceedings, as USSG § 1B1.10 
purports to do.”).      
 Moreover, the unfettered judicial discretion that 
Defendants seek to preserve is at odds with the narrow scope 
of § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction proceedings.  In Dillon, 
the Supreme Court made abundantly clear that sentence 
reduction proceedings pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) are not 
wholesale resentencings.
11
  Id. (“Section 3582(c)(2) does not 
                                              
 
11
 In their briefs, Defendants remind us that Dillon 
predated the revision to § 1B1.10 that is at issue here.  See 
130 S. Ct. at 2691-92.  We, however, fail to understand how 
that fact pertains to whether the Commission was authorized 
17 
 
authorize a sentencing or resentencing proceeding.”).  
“Congress intended to authorize only a limited adjustment to 
an otherwise final sentence,” id. at 2691, “within the narrow 
bounds established by the Commission,” id. at 2694.  The 
Court inferred Congress‟ intent not just from the text of 
§ 3582(c)(2) but also from the Commission‟s considerable 
control over sentence reduction proceedings under § 994(u).  
Id. at 2691-92.  It noted that, in addition to depending on the 
Commission‟s decision to make an amendment retroactive, 
courts are “constrained by [its] statements dictating „by what 
amount‟ the sentence of a prisoner . . . affected by [an] 
amendment „may be reduced.”  Id. at 2691.  For us to say that 
the Commission does not have the power to impose such 
constraints would therefore run afoul of Dillon.      
 As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals aptly 
summarized: “§ 994(u) requires the Commission to specify 
[by what amount sentences may be reduced based on 
retroactive amendments], § 994(a)(2)(C) requires that this 
specification be in the form of a policy statement, and § 
3582(c)(2) makes those policy statements binding.”  Horn, 
679 F.3d at 401-02.  Together, these provisions sink 
                                                                                                     
to make the revision.  In deciding that district courts may not 
correct mistakes in a prisoner‟s original sentence, the Court 
emphasized how § 3582(c)(2) only “permits a sentence 
reduction within the narrow bounds established by the 
Commission.”  Id. at 2694.  Like the errors the Court deemed 
outside the scope of reduction proceedings in Dillon, the 
comparable reductions Defendants seek here are outside the 
“narrow bounds established by the Commission.”  Id.  It just 
so happens that the Commission has, as it may, further 
narrowed those bounds since Dillon. 
18 
 
Defendants‟ contention that the Commission exceeded its 
statutory authority by prohibiting courts from reducing a 
prisoner‟s sentence below his amended Guidelines range 
except to reflect substantial assistance. 
B.  Separation of Powers 
 Defendants‟ argument that the new version of § 
1B1.10‟s limitation violates separation-of-powers principles 
fares no better.  They submit that the Commission‟s issuance 
of a binding policy statement suffers from two problems: 
first, it constitutes the exercise of legislative authority without 
necessary accountability to Congress; and, second, it infringes 
upon the exercise of judicial authority by courts.   
1.  Legislative Authority 
 As we noted above, Congress authorized the 
Commission to issue binding policy statements that limit the 
extent to which prisoners may benefit from retroactive 
Guidelines amendments.  We cannot agree that Congress‟ 
delegation of that authority to the Commission violates 
separation-of-powers principles. 
 “[R]ooted in the principle of separation of powers that 
underlies our tripartite system of Government,” the 
nondelegation doctrine generally prevents Congress from 
“delegat[ing] its legislative power to another Branch.”  
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989).   
However, a delegation of legislative power is permissible if 
Congress “lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible 
principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise 
the delegated authority] is directed to conform.”  Id. at 372 
(citations omitted).  “Congress need not expressly authorize 
19 
 
every determination made by the Commission.”  Garcia, 655 
F.3d at 435.  The Supreme Court has “upheld, . . . without 
deviation, Congress‟ ability to delegate power under broad 
standards.”  Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373. 
 In Mistretta, the Supreme Court rejected a 
nondelegation challenge to the SRA‟s broad grant of 
authority to the Commission.  Id. at 374.  It held that 
Congress‟ delegation of authority was “sufficiently specific 
and detailed to meet constitutional requirements.”  Id.  In 
support of its holding, the Court cited the considerable 
direction Congress gave the Commission on how to go about 
establishing a federal sentencing regime.  The Court 
described at length how, in 28 U.S.C. § 994, Congress 
specified the purposes the Commission must serve, the tools 
the Commission must use, the factors the Commission must 
consider, and other terms by which the Commission must 
abide in promulgating Guidelines.  Id. at 374-77.  On the 
basis of those provisions, the Court held that the SRA “sets 
forth more than merely an ‘intelligible principle’ or minimal 
standards.”  Id. at 379 (emphasis added).   
 Given that only an intelligible principle is required, 
“[t]he threshold for a constitutionally valid delegation is 
much lower than was the delegation in Mistretta.”  Garcia, 
655 F.3d at 435.  That threshold easily has been met here.  
“[B]oth §§ 994(u) and 994(a)(2) limit and inform the 
Commission on how it must exercise its delegated authority.”  
United States v. Smith, 459 Fed. App‟x 99, 101 (3d Cir. 
2012).  In § 994(u), Congress articulated the contours of the 
Commission‟s power: to “specify in what circumstances and 
by what amount the sentences of prisoners serving terms of 
imprisonment for [an] offense may be reduced” whenever it 
lowers the applicable Guidelines range for that offense.  28 
20 
 
U.S.C. § 994(u).  In § 994(a), Congress further guided the 
Commission‟s exercise of that authority.  First, it “prescribed 
the specific tool—policy statements—for the Commission to 
use in regulating the retroactive effect of sentencing.”  Horn, 
679 F.3d at 405.  Second, it required that any policy 
statements issued on the subject “further the purposes set 
forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a)(2).”  28 U.S.C. § 994 (a)(2).  
These provisions are of the same type as those on which the 
Mistretta Court relied and therefore satisfy us, as they have 
other courts, that Congress has “delineate[d] the general 
policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the 
boundaries of this delegated authority.”12  Mistretta, 488 U.S. 
at 373.  This is all that is constitutionally required.    
 Even outside the nondelegation context, we fail to see 
how the Commission‟s revision of § 1B1.10 upsets the 
constitutionally prescribed balance of power.  Defendants 
contend that when the Commission binds courts in § 
3582(c)(2) proceedings it “lacks the political accountability 
demanded by the separation of powers doctrine.”  Appellants‟ 
Br. at 40.  Their argument relies upon Mistretta‟s analysis of 
the Commission‟s location within the judicial branch.  The 
defendants in Mistretta argued that the SRA 
unconstitutionally expanded the power of the judicial branch 
by “uniting within [it] the . . . quasi-legislative power of the 
Commission with the judicial power of the courts.”  Mistretta, 
                                              
 
12
 For other decisions rejecting nondelegation 
challenges to the Commission‟s issuance of § 1B1.10, see 
Anderson, 686 F.3d at 590; Horn, 679 F.3d at 404; Smith, 459 
Fed. App‟x at 101; Garcia, 655 F.3d at 435; United States v. 
Fox, 631 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Dukes, 420 Fed. App‟x 237, 237 (4th Cir. 2011). 
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488 U.S. at 393.  The Court concluded that the Commission‟s 
powers are not united with the judiciary‟s power because the 
Commission is an independent agency accountable to 
Congress and the public.  Id.  Congress “can revoke or amend 
any or all of the Guidelines as it sees fit either within the 180-
day waiting period or at any time,” and the Commission‟s 
“rulemaking is subject to the notice and comment 
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.”  Id. at 
393-94 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(p) and (x)). 
 Although the Commission‟s policy statements are 
subject to neither the 180-day waiting period nor the APA‟s 
notice-and-comment requirements, its revision of § 1B1.10 
did not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.  The 
purpose of those measures—to make the Commission 
accountable—was fulfilled.  “Although policy statements are 
not subject to the 180-day waiting period applicable when the 
Commission passes a Guidelines Amendment, Congress can 
direct the Commission to change its retroactivity 
determination or pass a law overruling the Commission‟s 
determination „at any time.‟”13  Horn, 679 F.3d at 405-06 
                                              
 
13
 We emphasize that the Commission “endeavor[s] to 
include amendments to policy statements and commentary in 
any submission of guideline amendments to Congress.”  U.S. 
Sentencing Comm‟n, Rules of Practice and Proc. 4.1.  
Assuming, as we do, that the Commission followed its own 
rules when revising § 1B1.10, Congress was aware of the 
decision to further limit sentence reductions over the 180 days 
during which it considered Amendment 750.  It was 
“accordingly free to dictate an alternative . . . determination 
during the 180 days.”  Horn, 679 F.3d at 406.  
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(quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 394) (internal citation 
omitted); see also United States v. Fox, 631 F.3d 1128, 1131 
(9th Cir. 2011) (“Congress, of course, can override both 
Guidelines and Policy Statements by statute.”).  The 
Commission, then, remains fully accountable to Congress 
when it issues binding policy statements like § 1B1.10.  
Moreover, the Commission did solicit public views about § 
1B1.10(b)‟s limitation on sentence reductions and made its 
decision to make the limitation more stringent at a public 
hearing.  See 76 Fed. Reg. 24960 (May 3, 2011); U.S. 
Sentencing Comm‟n, Public Meeting Minutes (June 30, 
2011).
14
  “The public nature of the proceedings provided an 
effective check and allayed the concerns voiced by the Court 
in Mistretta.”  Horn, 679 F.3d at 406. 
 No legislative power imbalance of constitutional 
dimensions resulted from the Commission‟s decision to set a 
limit on sentence reductions pursuant to § 3582(c)(2).  
Congress validly delegated to the Commission authority to 
make that decision, drafted the statute that made it binding on 
courts, and retained the power to legislate over it.  The 
legislative authority Defendants ascribe to the Commission 
was not unfettered or otherwise improper.      
2.  Judicial Authority 
 The Commission‟s revision of § 1B1.10(b) did, 
admittedly, constrain the ability of courts entertaining § 
3582(c)(2) motions to reduce sentences.  On that basis, 
                                              
 
14
 The minutes of the Commission‟s June 30, 2011 
meeting are available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_ 
and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/2011063
0/Meeting_Minutes.pdf. 
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Defendants contend that it interfered with the judicial 
function and thereby violated separation-of-powers 
principles.  We do not agree for several reasons. 
 To start, we note that Congress, without question, 
possesses authority to restrict the judiciary‟s discretion in 
fashioning sentences.  See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364 
(“Congress, of course, has the power to fix the sentence for a 
federal crime, and the scope of judicial discretion with respect 
to a sentence is subject to congressional control.”).   And it is 
Congress that bound courts to the limitation in § 1B1.10, by 
expressly requiring that sentence reductions based on 
amendments to the Guidelines be consistent with the 
Commission‟s policy statements.  See supra Section II.A.  
“Even if the Commission were to attempt to promulgate a 
non-binding policy statement, district courts would still be 
bound to follow that policy statement under the express 
language of § 3582(c)(2).”  Horn, 679 F.3d at 404.  The 
Commission, therefore, is not acting alone in constraining 
judicial discretion; it is instead crafting policy statements that 
the legislative branch itself makes binding.     
 Even were we to consider the Commission‟s 
imposition of a binding limitation on courts separate and apart 
from the language of § 3582(c)(2), no separation-of-powers 
issue arises.  In the SRA, Congress explicitly placed the 
Commission within the judicial branch because of the role 
that branch has historically played in sentencing.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 991(a) (establishing the Commission “as an 
independent commission in the judicial branch of the United 
States”).  The Commission‟s location within the same branch 
as the courts suggests that no imbalance between the branches 
of government resulted from its revision of § 1B1.10.  In fact, 
the Mistretta Court approved of the Commission‟s location in 
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that branch precisely because its functions were “attendant” 
to courts‟ role in determining appropriate sentences.  488 U.S. 
at 391.  That is, the Court based its rejection of a separation-
of-powers challenge to the SRA in part on the Commission‟s 
exercise of the very function Defendants find so 
objectionable, i.e., its promulgation of “Guidelines [that] bind 
judges and courts in the exercise of their uncontested 
responsibility to pass sentence in criminal cases.”  Id.  The 
Commission‟s establishment of a limit on sentence reductions 
falls squarely within this function.  
 Defendants‟ arguments do not convince us otherwise.  
They emphasize the Court‟s conclusion in Mistretta that the 
Commission‟s “powers are not united with powers of the 
Judiciary in a way that has meaning for separation-of-powers 
analysis” in part because “it is not a court[ and] does not 
exercise judicial power.”  Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 393.  By 
interfering with the sentencing decisions of courts, 
Defendants argue, the Commission acts as a court and thereby 
upsets the constitutionally prescribed balance of power.  
Appellants‟ Br. at 41.  However, to start, we reiterate that 
Dillon emphasized that reductions are not sentencings, 130 S. 
Ct. at 2690, such that the decisions with which § 1B1.10 
interferes are not of the same nature as those considered in 
Mistretta.  What is more, the Mistretta Court concluded that 
the Commission did not exercise judicial power well before 
Booker—when the Commission‟s ability to limit courts‟ 
sentencing discretion was at its zenith.  See 488 U.S. at 367 
(describing the SRA as making “the Sentencing 
Commission‟s guidelines binding on the courts”).  The 
Commission no more interferes with the sentencing decisions 
of courts by limiting the extent to which sentences may be 
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reduced than when it established mandatory sentencing 
ranges under the pre-Booker regime. 
 The Commission‟s retention of the “tiniest sliver,” 
Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at 2693, of authority to restrict courts 
proceeding under § 3582(c)(2) therefore fully comports with 
separation-of-powers principles.  Defendants‟ fears about the 
effect of the Commission‟s revision to § 1B1.10 on the 
structural protections of the Constitution “prove . . . to be 
„more smoke than fire.‟”  Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 384.   
C.  Notice-and-Comment 
 Defendants‟ last remaining argument does not detain 
us for long because it is based on a faulty premise.  
Defendants contend that the Commission‟s failure to comply 
with the APA‟s notice-and-comment procedure bars 
enforcement of § 1B1.10.  However, the Commission is not 
required to abide by the APA‟s notice-and-comment 
provisions when issuing policy statements.  Its purported 
failure to do so, then, does not invalidate the new limitation 
on sentence reductions. 
 The statutory scheme established by the SRA makes 
clear that the Commission is only subject to the APA‟s 
notice-and-comment provisions when promulgating 
Guidelines.  After differentiating between the subjects that 
may be addressed via Guidelines and policy statements, 28 
U.S.C. § 994(a), Congress imposed different requirements for 
the Commission‟s use of each tool.  Section 994(x) provides 
that “[t]he provisions of section 553 of title 5, relating to 
publication in the Federal Register and public hearing 
procedure, shall apply to the promulgation of guidelines 
pursuant to this section.”  28 U.S.C. § 994(x) (emphasis 
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added).  Unlike in certain surrounding provisions, see 28 
U.S.C. §§ 994(t) and (v), § 994(x) makes no reference to the 
Commission‟s issuance of policy statements.  The omission 
can only be interpreted to exclude policy statements from § 
994(x)‟s application of the APA‟s notice-and-comment 
provisions.
15
  See Fox, 631 F.3d at 1131 (“The Sentencing 
Commission must jump through more procedural hoops to 
issue a Guideline than to issue a Policy Statement.” (citing, 
inter alia, 28 U.S.C. § 994(x))).      
 We cannot agree with Defendants that the mandatory 
nature of § 1B1.10 alters this reasoning or result.  Appellants‟ 
Br. at 50.  Defendants contend that administrative law 
principles prevent agencies from avoiding notice-and-
comment by announcing binding precedent in general 
statements of policy.  Id. (citing Ctr. for Auto. Safety v. Nat’l 
Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 452 F.3d 798, 807 (D.C. Cir. 
2006)).  Such administrative law principles, however, are of 
limited application to this case.  “Congress decided that the 
Sentencing Commission would not be an „agency‟ under the 
APA when it established the Commission as an independent 
entity in the judicial branch.”  Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. 
Sentencing Comm’n, 17 F.3d 1446, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1994); 
see also id. (“Congress . . . decided that the Commission 
                                              
 
15
 Curiously, Defendants‟ separation-of-powers 
argument is based in large part on the fact that the 
Commission is not subject to the same procedural 
requirements when issuing policy statements as when 
promulgating Guidelines.  In fact, Defendants actually relied 
heavily on the inapplicability of APA notice-and-comment to 
argue that the Commission escaped necessary accountability 
when revising § 1B1.10. 
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would not be subject to the provisions of the APA except as 
specifically enumerated.”).   And even were the Commission 
subject to the rules governing other agencies, the principle to 
which Defendants refer would still be of dubious applicability 
because, as we stated earlier, it was Congress—not the 
Commission—that made § 1B1.10 binding. 
 Given that the Commission is not obligated to abide by 
the APA‟s notice-and-comment provisions when issuing 
policy statements, we need not address the adequacy of the 
notice-and-comment procedures it used to revise § 1B1.10‟s 
limitation on sentence reductions.   The Commission properly 
issued the policy statement, and it is therefore valid.  
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm both the 
order denying Berberena‟s motion for a sentence reduction 
and the order granting in part Gayle‟s motion for a sentence 
reduction.  
 
